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Abstract: An experiment examined the effects of outcome feedback and three types of performance 
feedback - calibration feedback, resolution feedback, and covariance feedback - on various aspects of 
the performance of probability forecasters. Subjects made 55 forecasts in each of four sessions, 
receiving feedback prior to making their forecasts in each of the last three sessions. The provision of 
calibration feedback was effective in improving both the calibration and overforecasting of probability 
forecasters, but the improvement was not gradual; it occurred in one step, between the second and 
third sessions. Simple outcome feedback had very little effect on forecasting performance. Neither 
resolution nor covariance feedback affected forecasters’ performances much differently than outcome 
feedback. However, unlike outcome feedback, the provision of performance feedback caused subjects 
to manage their use of the probability scale. Subjects switched from two-digit probabilities to one-digit 
probabilities, and those receiving calibration and resolution feedback also reduced the number of 
different probabilities they used. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we investigate the effects of 
different forms of performance feedback and 
associated training on the quality of judgmental 
probability forecasts provided by individual 
forecasters. Performance feedback is one of four 
types of feedback that are relevant in judgmental 
forecasting tasks; the others are outcome, pro- 
cess, and environmental feedback. All are de- 
fined below: 
l Outcome feedback is information about the 
realization of a previously predicted event. 
C‘orrespondmce to: P.G. Benson, Carlson School of Manage- 
ment. University of Minnesota. 271 19th Avenue South, 
Minneapolis. MN 55355, USA. 
l Performance feedback is information about the 
accuracy of the forecaster’s predictions. It is 
derived from the forecaster’s predictions and 
the outcomes that occur. 
l Process feedback is information about the 
forecaster’s cognitive processes. It includes in- 
formation about the evidence perceived by the 
forecaster, how the forecaster utilizes evidence 
in developing predictions, and information 
about the predictions themselves. 
l Environmental feedback (or task feedback) is 
information about the event to be predicted, 
including the factors that may influence the 
event and their relationship to the event. 
[For a more general description of these feed- 
back types, set Balzer et al. (1989).] Feedback 
research in the area of probability forecasting 
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has been concerned with outcome and perform- 
ance feedback. We know of no probability fore- 
casting studies that have addressed process or 
environmental feedback. 
Outcome feedback has proven to be ineffec- 
tive for improving the accuracy of probability 
forecasts ]Fischer (1982)]. It provides neither the 
information forecasters need to understand the 
key relationships in the environment [Brehmer 
(1980>], nor the information that forecasters 
would find useful for calibrating their probability 
forecasts to better reflect the relative frequency 
of occurrence of the forecasted events. Consider 
a securities analyst who is responsible for fore- 
casting the direction of change in the quarterly 
earnings of a particular firm. Knowledge of only 
the firm’s actual quarterly earnings - outcome 
feedback - clearly is not sufficient for the analyst 
to either understand the forces that caused those 
earnings or know how to improve her usage of 
the probability scale in developing the next quar- 
tcr’s forecast. 
Two kinds of performance feedback have 
been investigated: scoring-rule feedback and 
calibration feedback. A scoring rule assigns a 
reward or penalty to a forecaster as a function of 
the forecaster’s reported probability forecasts 
and the outcomes that occur [Winkler (1969), 
Friedman (19X3)]. Scoring rules are typically 
designed to indicate the extent of a forecaster’s 
‘external correspondence’ - i.e. the extent to 
which the forecaster assigns probabilities close to 
1 for events that occur and probabilities close to 
0 for events that do not occur [Yates (19X2)]. 
Scoring-rule feedback consists of the forecaster’s 
score for a set of probability forecasts. 
Laboratory experiments have yielded mixed 
results for scoring-rule feedback. Stael von Hols- 
tein (1972) and Fischer (1982) concluded that 
such feedback had no effect on the forecasting 
performances of their subjects. However, based 
on an experiment similar to Stael von Holstein’s, 
Kidd (1973) [cited in Beach (1975)j concluded 
that scoring-rule feedback was effective and 
could be used to improve the accuracy of prob- 
abihty forecasters. 
Calibration feedback provides forecasters with 
information about their ability to assign appro- 
priate probabilities to outcomes. A forecaster is 
said to be well-calibrated if for all predicted 
outcomes assigned a given probability, the pro- 
portion of those outcomes that occur (referred to 
below as the ‘proportion correct’) is equal to the 
probability. For example, if it actually rained on 
40% of the days that a weather forecaster pre- 
dicts a 0.4 chance of rain, the forecaster’s 0.4 
prob~biii~y forecasts are will-calibrated. If a var- 
iety of the weather forecaster’s other probability 
forecasts similarly match event frequencies, the 
weather forecaster is well-calibrated. The calib- 
ration component of the Brier Scoring Rule can 
be used to evaluate calibration [Brier (195(I), 
Murphy (1973)j. Calibration feedback has not 
been standardized. At a minimum, it consists of 
numerical summaries and/or graphical displays 
of the reported probabilities, the proportion cor- 
rect associated with each probability value, and 
the number of assessments of each value. 
Calibration feedback appears to be a promis- 
ing means of improving the performance of 
probability forecasters. Both individualized and 
group feedback have proven to be effective in 
field studies of weather forecasters even though 
only one feedback session was employed [Mur- 
phy and Daan (1984). Murphy et al. (1985)]. 
Except for scoring-rule feedback, perform- 
ance feedback in forecasting tasks has not been 
evaluated in the laboratory. In this paper we 
report the results of a laboratory experiment that 
investigated the effects of three different forms 
of performance feedback - calibration feedback. 
resolution feedback, and covariance feedback - 
on the performance of probability forecasters. 
Section 2 briefly reviews two feedback studies 
that arc relevant for motivating the current study 
and for understanding and interpreting its rc- 
suits. Section 3 describes the experiment. Sec- 
tions 4 and 5 present and discuss the results of 
the experiment, respectively. Section 6 presents 
conclusions and directions for future research. 
2. Relevant performance feedback studies 
Studies of the effects of performance feedback 
on subjective pr~~bability assessments fall into 
two categories: those concerned with probability 
forecasts and those concerned with assessments 
of confidence in answers to general-knowledge 
questions. In the latter case, subjects are typical- 
ly asked to answer almanac-type questions (e.g. 
Is the population of Minnesota greater than the 
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population of Wisconsin?) and to provide subjec- 
tive probabilities that reflect their confidence in 
their answers. Such ‘general-knowledge tasks’ 
have received considerably more attention from 
researchers than probability-forecasting tasks. 
[For a review of this literature, see Lichtenstein 
et al. (1982).] 
Even though the focus of the present paper is 
forecasting, there are several reasons for being 
concerned with previous studies of general- 
knowledge tasks. First, there is the possibility 
that results from such studies can be generalized 
to forecasting tasks. Fischhoff and MacGregor 
(1982) argue that judgments of confidence in 
answers to general-knowledge questions are 
similar to judgments of confidence in forecasts 
(i.e. probability forecasts). On the basis of their 
empirical results, they conclude that ‘. . .one 
should have considerably increased confidence in 
extrapolating the results of earlier [general- 
knowledge-task] research to confidence in fore- 
casts’ (p. 169). However, Wright and Ayton 
(1986) and Ronis and Yates (1987) argue to the 
contrary. We come down on the side of the latter 
two papers, as will be explained in Section 5. 
Second, the general-knowledge studies of Lich- 
tenstein and Fischhoff (1980) and Sharp et al. 
(1988) have informed the design of the present 
study. Third, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff’s em- 
pirical results serve as a basis of comparison for 
the results of the present paper. Accordingly, we 
briefly describe pertinent aspects of these two 
studies. 
A consistent finding of general-knowledge 
studies is that the calibration of subjects’ confi- 
dence judgments is at best fair, with the pre- 
dominant reason for miscalibration being over- 
confidence. Subjects apparently believe that they 
have greater knowledge than they actually pos- 
sess [Fischhoff et al. (1977)]. For example, of the 
answers in which subjects are totally confident 
and so indicate with a probability of 1.0, only 
85% may be correct. Of the answers assigned a 
probability of 0.8, only 60% may be correct. 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) investigated 
the use of calibration feedback and associated 
training as a means of eliminating such mis- 
calibration. In each of 11 sessions, 12 subjects 
answered 200 two-alternative, general-knowl- 
edge questions. For each question, subjects 
chose the answer they believed to be correct and 
assigned a probability between 0.5 and 1.0 to 
indicate their confidence in the chosen answer. 
After each of the 11 sessions, subjects received 
individualized performance feedback that in- 
cluded calibration feedback, a measure of their 
overconfidence (described later), their Brier 
Score, and the knowledge, calibration, and res- 
olution components of their Brier Score derived 
using Murphy’s (1973) decomposition (i.e. Brier 
Score = Knowledge Score + Calibration Score - 
Resolution Score). 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff found that feed- 
back significantly improved subjects’ calibration, 
and that virtually all of the improvement came 
between the first and second feedback sessions. 
In a second experiment, using only three feed- 
back sessions, the same results were obtained. 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff also evaluated the 
resolution performance of their subjects. In the 
context of general-knowledge studies, resolution 
refers to an individual’s ability to discriminate 
between answers that are correct and incorrect 
by differentially assigning probabilities to correct 
and incorrect answers. Lichtenstein and Fisch- 
hoff evaluated their subjects’ resolution using the 
resolution-component of the Brier Scoring Rule. 
In both experiments, resolution was basically 
unaffected by feedback. 
Sharp et al. (1988) also investigated the ef- 
fects of performance feedback on confidence 
judgments. In each of four sessions one week 
apart, 54 subjects (of which 27 comprised a 
feedback group and 27 a control group) an- 
swered 60 general-knowledge questions and re- 
ported subjective probabilities that represented 
their confidence in the chosen answers. At the 
start of sessions 2, 3, and 4, subjects were given 
calibration feedback from the previous session. 
In addition, each subject was given the average 
of the probabilities she assigned to correct an- 
swers and the average probability for incorrect 
answers. 
Unlike Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980), 
they found that feedback did not significantly 
influence calibration or overconfidence, but that 
it did influence subjects’ resolution. The feed- 
back group’s resolution performance improved 
across the four sessions relative to the control 
group’s. What makes this result particularly in- 
teresting is that ‘. .the feedback contained no 
strategic information which would lead to im- 
proved resolution [Sharp et al. (1988. p. 28(I)]. 
The difference in the resolution results of the 
two studies can in part be explained by the 
different resolution measures used in the studies. 
Sharp et al. argue that the resolution component 
of the Brier Scoring Rule, which was the mea- 
sure used by Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, is inap- 
propriate. They point out that (1) it is bounded 
above by the knowledge score of the Brier-Score 
decomposition, and (2) knowledge scores differ 
among subjects. As a result, they maintain that 
resolution performance should not be evaluated 
by comparing subjects’ raw resolution scores, but 
by computing each subject’s resolution-score to 
knowledge-score ratio (called n’) and comparing 
them. We employ this resolution measure in our 
analysis. 
The present study investigates the effects of 
calibration and resolution feedback on probabili- 
ty forecasters in a laboratory setting. In addition, 
the effects of covariance feedback (described in 
the next section), another form of performance 
feedback, are studied. These three types of per- 
formance feedback are compared with simple 
outcome feedback. We expected each type of 
performance feedback to improve forecasting 
performance. In particular, we expected calibra- 
tion feedback to improve forecasters’ calibration 
scores; resolution feedback to improve forecas- 
ters’ resolution scores; and covariance feedback 
to improve forecasters’ slope and scatter scores 
(described later) of the covariance decomposi- 
tion of their Brier Scores. We did not expect 
outcome feedback to improve forecasting per- 
formance. 
3. Method 
3.1. Subjects and task 
Eighty paid subjects from the University of 
Minnesota who expressed an interest in college 
football began the four-week-long experiment. 
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of 
three feedback groups - calibration feedback, 
resolution feedback, or covariance feedback - or 
to a control group. Owing primarily to the length 
and time commitment required by the experi- 
ment, a number of subjects dropped out of the 
study while it was in progress. Fifty-two subjects 
(41 undergraduate students, 10 graduate stu- 
dents, and one faculty member) completed the 
experiment. The calibration, resolution, and 
covariance feedback groups were comprised of 
15, 11, and 16 subjects, respectively; 10 subjects 
served in the control group. 
The experiment involved four weekly fore- 
casting sessions. In each session, subjects were 
asked to make probability forecasts for the out- 
comes of 55 major college football games that 
were to be played the following weekend. Sub- 
jects were given a list of the games to be pre- 
dicted (with home and visiting teams identified) 
one week prior to the forecasting session. For 
each of the games in each session, subjects were 
asked to predict the winning team and to assess a 
subjective probability (between 0.5 and 1.0, in- 
clusive) that reflected that team’s chances of 
winning. This is referred to as a two-alternative, 
half-range, assessment task [Lichtenstein et al. 
( 1982)]. Recent evidence suggests that such as- 
sessment structures may be superior to full-range 
tasks (i.e. asking for a probability between 0 and 
1.0) in forecasting problems [Ronis and Yates 
(1987)]. At the beginning of each of the last 
three sessions, subjects in the feedback groups 
received performance feedback derived from 
their predictions from the previous weeks. Con- 
trol group subjects received only outcome 
feedback. 
3.2. Training and feedback 
At the beginning of the first session all sub- 
jects received approximately 1 h of training in 
subjective probability and probability forecast- 
ing, including training in two-alternative, half- 
range, probability forecasting tasks. At the be- 
ginning of each of the remaining three sessions, 
each subject received a listing of her predictions 
and probability assessments from the previous 
week, along with the actual outcomes of the 55 
games (i.e. game scores). All groups including 
the control group received this outcome feed- 
back. Subjects in the treatment groups also re- 
ceived performance feedback. 
The provision of outcome feedback to all 
groups seemed appropriate since game scores 
were available to the subjects outside the labora- 
tory through newspapers. television, etc. 
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Furthermore, in most real forecasting tasks (e.g. 
weather forecasts, sales forecasts) forecasters re- 
ceive outcome feedback. Also, it made it pos- 
sible for the experimenter to interact with and 
motivate control group subjects. 
At each session, all feedback from earlier 
sessions was available to the subjects. In all 
groups, subjects were encouraged to participate 
in one-on-one discussions with the experimenter 
concerning their personal feedback. Since the 
informational and motivational aspects of feed- 
back and training were confounded, there was a 
deliberate attempt to provide similar attention 
and motivation to all groups and all subjects. 
3.2.1. Control group 
Control group subjects received (1) outcome 
feedback and (2) their ranking within the group 
as determined by their Brier Scores. Subjects 
were not informed of the criteria used to estab- 
lish rankings. The ranking was used to motivate 
performance. 
3.2.2. Calibration feedback group 
Subjects in the calibration feedback group 
received (1) outcome feedback, (2) their in- 
dividual calibration scores computed using the 
calibration component of Murphy’s decomposi- 
tion of the Brier Score, (3) their individual calib- 
ration curves (described below), (4) the best and 
the average calibration scores for their group, 
and (5) their ranking within the group as de- 
termined by calibration scores. Items (4) and (5) 
were used to motivate performance. 
The computation of the calibration compo- 
nent requires that all probability forecasts be 
grouped into categories (0.50 to 0.59, 0.60 to 
0.69, etc.). A calibration curve is constructed by 
plotting the proportion of correct forecasts in 
each category against the respective mean prob- 
ability forecast for the category. The resulting 
points are then connected with line segments, 
beginning with the lowest mean probability fore- 
cast and proceeding to the highest [Lichtenstein 
et al. (1982)]. 
At the beginning of the second, third, and 
fourth sessions, the concept of calibration and 
the calculation of the calibration score were dis- 
cussed in detail. Calibration curves were ex- 
plained and perfect calibration, overforecasting, 
and underforecasting were illustrated through 
examples. A forecaster is said to be overforecast- 
ing (underforecasting) when her probability fore- 
casts tend to be larger (smaller) than the propor- 
tion of correct forecasts [Murphy and Daan 
(1984)]. In studies of confidence judgments, this 
phenomenon is referred to as overconjidence 
(underconfidence). Subjects were encouraged to 
construct probability forecasts in a manner that 
would ‘move’ their calibration curves from ear- 
lier sessions as close to the 45” line (perfect 
calibration) as possible. 
3.2.3. Resolution feedback group 
Subjects in the resolution feedback group 
were given (1) outcome feedback, (2) their in- 
dividual resolution scores computed using the 
resolution component of Murphy’s decomposi- 
tion of the Brier Score, (3) their individual calib- 
ration curves, (4) the best and the average res- 
olution scores for the group, (5) their ranking 
within their group as determined by resolution 
scores, and (6) a knowledge-level analysis of 
their forecasts. Items (4) and (5) were used to 
motivate performance. As in Sharp et al.‘s 
(1988) study, the feedback contained no new 
information about the events being forecasted. 
The last feedback item was designed to help 
subjects attain maximally different proportions 
of correct forecasts for their reported prob- 
abilities and thereby improve their resolution 
scores. To develop this feedback item, all resolu- 
tion-group subjects were asked to indicate at the 
time they made their predictions whether their 
knowledge of the game in questions was ‘none’, 
‘very little’, ‘a fair amount’, or ‘very extensive’. 
Subjects were specifically instructed to indicate 
their knowledge level prior to making a predic- 
tion. Examples of different knowledge levels 
were discussed with the subjects. Subjects were 
given feedback on the knowledge levels associ- 
ated with each probability category they used. 
For each probability category, a tabular fre- 
quency distribution describing the knowledge 
levels was supplied. 
At the beginning of the second, third, and 
fourth sessions, the concept and definition of 
resolution were discussed in detail. Calibration 
curves were explained and examples used to 
illustrate good vs. poor resolution. Subjects were 
encouraged to categorize their forecasts using 
probability classes whose proportions correct 
would be maximally different from the overall 
proportion of correct forecasts. Subjects were 
urged to rely on their knowledge of each game in 
constructing probability forecasts. They were in- 
structed to use the knowledge-level distributions 
to help them see the relationship between the 
probabilities they used and their level of knowl- 
edge. They were advised that high probabilities 
should be associated with high knowledge levels, 
but that low probabilities could be associated 
with either low or high knowledge levels. Thus, 
they were urged not to assess high probabilities 
unless they had both a high knowledge level and 
strong evidence favoring a particular team. 
3.2.4. Covariance feedback group 
The feedback supplied to the covariance feed- 
back group was derived from the covariance 
decomposition of the Brier Score, as were cer- 
tain measures used later in the paper to evaluate 
the performances of forecasters in all of the 
experimental groups. Accordingly, before pro- 
ceeding with a description of covariance feed- 
back, we briefly review relevant aspects of the 
covariance decomposition. 
3.2.4.1. The covariance decomposition. Instead 
of focusing on groupings or categories of similar 
probabilities as does Murphy’s decomposition, 
the analytic strategy of the covariance decompo- 
sition involves grouping probabilities according 
to whether or not they are associated with the 
occurrence of a target event [Yates (1982)]. For 
example, in weather forecasting, precipitation 
forecasts could be grouped according to whether 
it actually rained (the target event) or not on the 
days for which forecasts were made. Yates 
(1982) recommended that ‘covariance graphs’ be 
used for (1) interpreting the components of the 
decomposition and (2) uncovering systematic dif- 
ferences that may exist in the probability fore- 
casts reported when the target event does and 
does not occur [see also Yates and Curley 
(1985)]. An example covariance graph is pre- 
sented in Exhibit 1. 
The covariance graph consists of two histo- 
grams that are conditional distributions of prob- 
ability forecasts: one for when the target out- 
come occurred (d = 1) and one for when it did 
not (d = 0). The mean of the former distribution 
is indicated by 7,; the mean of the latter by x,. 
i, = 4000 
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Exhibit I. Examplar covariance graph. 
The horizontal dotted line marks the overall 
mean probability forecast, f The variances of the 
two conditional distributions are denoted by 
var f, and var f;,, respectively. The overall var- 
iance of the reported forecasts is denoted by s: 
and is referred to as the ‘forecast variance’. The 
vertical dotted line indicates the overall relative 
frequency of the target outcome’s occurrence, 2. 
In the remainder of this subsection we use the 
covariance graph to help describe three elements 
of the covariance decomposition that are used 
later in the paper: slope, scatter, and bias. Con- 
sider the line connecting the points (0, 5,) and 
(1, 7,) on the covariance graph. Its slope, (7, - 
fi,), is a measure of forecast performance. This 
‘forecast slope’ - later simply called ‘slope’ - is 
an indication of the forecaster’s ability to dis- 
criminate between instances when the target out- 
come will and will not occur. The higher the 
slope, the better the forecaster is able to dis- 
criminate, and the better (lower) is the forecas- 
ter’s Brier Score. 
Yates (1982) showed that the forecast var- 
iance can be decomposed as follows: 
s;7 = min var f + scat f . 
where 
min var f = ( 
scat f = (N, 
f-, - &)‘d( 1 - d) , 
var f, + N,, var f;,) /N , 
P.G. Benson, D. Onkal I Effects of feedback 565 
and 
N, = the number of occurrences of the target 
outcome, 
N, = the number of non-occurrences of the 
target outcome, 
N = the total number of probability forecasts 
(N = N, + NJ . 
The component labeled ‘min var f’ is the mini- 
mum forecast variance that the forecaster can 
achieve while maintaining the level of discrimi- 
nation (7, - &) between occasions when the 
target even does and does not occur. It is that 
part of the forecast variance that reflects the 
forecaster’s ability to discriminate between out- 
comes. It is what the forecast variance would be 
if the conditional forecast variances, var f, and 
var A,, were zero (i.e. if there were no scatter of 
forecasts about the conditional mean forecasts, f, 
and f,,). In contrast, scat f or ‘scatter’ is the 
weighted mean of the two conditional forecast 
variances. It is that part of the forecast variance 
that is not attributable to the forecaster’s ability 
to discriminate between outcomes; it is excessive 
variance due primarily to the forecaster’s re- 
action to non-predictive environmental cues. 
Ideally, this variance component would be zero. 
The difference between the overall mean fore- 
cast and the mean outcome index (7 - d) is 
referred to by Yates as the forecast ‘bias’. The 
smaller the absolute value of the bias, the better 
‘calibrated-in-the-large’ the forecaster is said to 
be [Yates and Curley (1985)]. 
We turn now to the description of covariance 
feedback. 
3.2.4.2. Covariance feedback. Subjects in the 
covariance feedback group received (1) outcome 
feedback, (2) their Brier Scores and their in- 
dividual component scores from the covariance 
decomposition [i.e. Brier Score = d( 1 - d) + 
minvarf+scatf+(~-d)2-2cov(f,d); see 
Yates (1982)], (3) their individual covariance 
graphs, (4) the Brier Scores of the best and the 
average performer of the group, and (5) their 
ranking within the group as determined by the 
Brier Scores. Items (4) and (5) were used to 
motivate performance. 
At the beginning of the second, third, and 
fourth sessions, the covariance decomposition 
was discussed and demonstrated. It was ex- 
plained that for their forecasting problem the 
target outcome employed in the decomposition 
was ‘home team wins the game’. [This is the 
same target outcome used by Yates (1982) and 
Yates and Curley (1985).] The meaning and 
significance of the components were explained 
using covariance graphs. The use of the 
covariance decomposition and covariance graphs 
to analyze forecasting performance was ex- 
plained and demonstrated. Subjects were en- 
couraged to construct probability forecasts that 
would maximize the slope of their covariance 
graph and minimize the scatter of their forecasts. 
4. Results 
To investigate the effects of the different 
forms of performance feedback on the external 
correspondence of subjects’ probability fore- 
casts, we analyzed the session-by-session per- 
formances in two ways. Like Lichtenstein and 
Fischhoff (1980), we analyzed the across-session 
performances within each treatment group, and 
like Sharp et al. (1988) we compared each 
group’s performance with that of the control 
group. Forecasting performance was evaluated 
using the Brier Score and six performance mea- 
sures derived from decompositions of the Brier 
Score: the calibration and resolution components 
of Murphy’s decomposition, n2 [the resolution 
measure suggested by Sharp et al. (1988) and 
described in Section 21, and bias, slope, and 
scatter from the covariance decomposition. In 
addition, a measure of overforecasting was em- 
ployed. The mean of all probability forecasts 
minus the overall proportion correct ( f - 2) was 
used to measure overforecasting [Fischhoff and 
MacGregor (1982)]. A positive score indicates 
overforecasting, and a negative score reflects 
underforecasting. 
Exhibits 2 through 5 present the means and 
standard deviations for the eight performance 
measures for each experimental group in each 
session, along with the proportion correct for 
each session as a measure of session difficulty. 
Statistically significant changes in group per- 
formance from one session to the next (as de- 
termined by paired-difference t-tests) are de- 
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noted by asterisks on the mean of the later 
session. Significant changes from the first to the 
last session are denoted by superscripts defined 
in the footnotes of the exhibits. In the case of the 
bias performance measure, the exhibits report 
mean bias scores (to preserve the information in 
the sign of the score), but the significance tests 
were conducted using absolute bias scores, the 
measure of calibration-in-the-large suggested by 
Yates and Curley (1985). 
Ordinary-r-tests were used to compare the 
within-session performances of the feedback 
groups and the control group. The results of 
these tests are reported below but do not appear 
in the exhibits. 
Finally, to determine whether forecasters 
manage their use of the probability scale differ- 
ently when exposed to different forms of feed- 
back and training, we describe any systematic 
differences in the probability values used by 
subjects of the different groups. The following 
subsections present the results of our analysis for 
each experimental group in turn. We begin with 
the control group. 
Exhibit 2 
Means of performance measures for the control group. 
Session 
4.1. Control group (Exhibit 2) 
As expected, the provision of only outcome 
feedback was not sufficient to improve forecast- 
ing performance. For all but one measure, the 
performance of the control group either re- 
mained the same or deteriorated over the four 
sessions. Their Brier Scores, calibration, over- 
forecasting, and scatter all deteriorated. Scatter 
deteriorated gradually over the four sessions and 
ended up significantly worse in session 4 than in 
session 1 (p = 0.027). No significant changes in 
resolution performance were observed using 
either Murphy’s resolution component or n’, and 
slope was essentially the same in the first and last 
sessions ( p = 0.33). However, the control group 
did improve their ‘calibration-in-the-large’ (i.e. 
absolute bias). In other words, the average prob- 
ability assigned to the target event ‘home team 
wins’ was closer to the actual proportion of home 
team wins in the later sessions. 
This pattern of results can be explained in 
part by examining the changes in the group’s 
usage of probability values across the four ses- 
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0.208 0.248**” 0.239 0.231*’ 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.038) (0.030) 
0.020 0.042*w 0.040 o.043*F 
(0.011) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) 
0.034 o.131***” 0.102 o.112**fi 
(0.080) (0.066) (0.102) (0.098) 
0.023 0.030 0.026 0.034 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.012) (0.016) 
0.113 0.128 0.113 0.123 
(0.099) (0.084) (0.052) (0.073) 
-0.076 0.075 -0.013**” -o.045*L 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.045) (0.053) 
0.238 0.176**” 0.193 0.227 
(0.118) (0.087) (0.054) (0.087) 
0.057 0.068 0.075 0.083*t 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.038) (0.042) 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
* p co.05; ** p<O.Ol: *** p<0.0001. 
” Performance worse than previous session; B performance better than previous session. 
’ First session performance better than last session performance; I last session performance better than first session performance. 
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sions. The median number of different prob- 
abilities used by subjects was 6 in both sessions 1 
and 4. However, subjects tended to shift their 
probability usage from lower values to higher 
values. In session 1, 39% of the forecasts were 
between 0.80 and 1.00 with 11% of these being 
1.00s; in session 4 it increased to 56% with 20% 
being 1.00s. In addition, the control group was 
the only group of subjects that consistently used 
two-decimal probabilities in all four sessions. All 
other groups began with a mixture of one- and 
two-decimal probabilities, but by the third ses- 
sion every subject was using only one-decimal 
probabilities. 
When not accompanied by increased knowl- 
edge, the observed shift in probability usage 
would tend to increase overforecasting and ad- 
versely affect calibration, scatter, and slope. This 
is consistent with the pattern revealed in Exhibit 
2. 
calibration score decreased significantly in the 
third session and maintained this higher per- 
formance level in the fourth session. As in Lich- 
tenstein and Fischhoff’s (1980) study of confi- 
dence judgments, improvement in calibration 
was not gradual, but occurred in one step. In 
their study, it occurred between sessions 1 and 2; 
in the present study, it occurred between ses- 
sions 2 and 3. Ten of the 15 subjects improved 
their calibration scores after the second session; 
no such improvement was observed for any of 
the other sessions. Similarly, overforecasting 
scores improved significantly in the third session 
and maintained that higher level in the fourth 
session. Ten of the 15 subjects achieved im- 
proved (i.e. reduced) overforecasting scores in 
session 3. 
4.2. Calibration-feedback group (Exhibit 3) 
As expected, the provision of calibration feed- 
back resulted in improved forecasting perform- 
ance. The calibration-feedback group’s mean 
These findings were substantiated in com- 
parisons with the control group. There were no 
significant differences in the mean calibration 
scores of the two groups in sessions 1 and 2, 
while in sessions 3 and 4 the calibration-feedback 
group’s performance was superior ( p = 0.029 for 
session 3; p = 0.042 for session 4). Similar results 
were observed for both overforecasting and 
scatter. 
Exhibit 3 
Means of performance measures for the calibration-feedback group. 
Session 
1 2 3 4 
Proportion correct 0.687 0.634 0.650 0.663 
(0.076) (0.058) (0.043) (0.059) 
Brier Score 0.209 0.237**” 0.225 0.222 
(0.038) (0.040) (0.026) (0.021) 
Calibration 0.035 0.037 0.018*” 0.023*L 
(0.038) (0.030) (0.018) (0.024) 
Overforecasting 0.056 o.105*w 0.045*R o.o25*L 
(0.084) (0.073) (0.061) (0.062) 




0.118 0.125 0.091 0.082 
(0.070) (0.077) (0.081) (0.080) 
Bias -0.077 0.088 -0.013***” -o.066***w 
(0.021) (0.033) (0.024) 
Slope 
(0.025) 
0.254 0.196 0.165 0.160**’ 
(0.134) (0.074) (0.074) 
Scatter 
(0.077) 
0.063 0.068 0.05 1 0.048 
(0.023) (0.030) (0.021) (0.022) 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
* pt0.05; ** p<O.Ol; *** p<0.0001. 
w Performance worse than previous session; B performance better than previous session. 
F First session performance better than last session performance; ’ last session performance better than first session performance. 
As in Lichtenstein and Fischhoff’s study, the 
improvements in calibration and overforecasting 
were not accompanied by significant worsening 
in resolution, whether measured by Murphy’s 
resolution component or n’. However, while not 
signi~cant from session to session, slope de- 
teriorated signi~cantly between sessions 1 and 4 
( p = 0.004). This suggests that the improvement 
in calibration and overforecasting may have been 
partly at the expense of discrimination. 
tween the two groups in any of the sessions (all 
p-values >0.05). 
Absolute bias (i.e. calibration-in-the-large) 
was not significantly different in session 4 than in 
session 1, although it improved significantly in 
session 3 and deteriorated significantly in session 
4. No significant across-session trends were ob- 
served in scatter. 
When the mean resolution. mean n’, and 
mean slope scores were compared with those of 
the control group, the only significant differences 
occurred in session 4. The calibration-feedback 
group displayed the poorer performance on all 
three measures (y = 0.026, 0.045, and 0.034, 
respectively). This also suggests that the im- 
proved calibration of the calibration-feedback 
group came at the expense of discrimination. No 
significant differences in the mean Brier Score or 
mean absolute bias scores were observed be- 
In contrast to the control group, subjects re- 
sponded to calibration feedback and training by 
decreasing the number of different probabilities 
used (session 1 median was 6; session 4 median 
was 5) and by increasing their usage of lower 
probabilities and decreasing their usage of higher 
probabilities. In session 1, 44% of the forecasts 
were between 0.80 and 1.00 with 16% of all 
forecasts being 1.00s; in session 4, only 27% of 
the forecasts were between 0.80 and 1.00, with 
only 8% of all forecasts being 1.00s. Lichtenstein 
and Fischhoff (1980) observed a similar shift in 
probability usage in their calibration-feedback 
study. This change in probability usage would 
tend to improve a forecaster’s overforecasting, 
but would also tend to reduce the slope of the 
forecaster’s covariance graph. This is consistent 
with the results described above. 
Contrary to our expectations and to the re- 
sults obtained by Sharp et al. (1988), the resolu- 
tion feedback and training did not affect the 
group’s resolution performance. Neither the res- 
Exhibit 4 
Means of performance measures for the resolution-feedback group. 
Session 
1 2 3 
Proportion correct 0.660 0.635 0.600 
(0.042) (0.062) (0.052) 
Bricr Score 0.218 0.229 0.251 *W 
(0.026) (0.032) (tN39) 
~aiibration 0.023 0.030 0.041 ** 
(0.016) (~.~12#) (0.02s) 
Overforecasting u.02s 0.050 ().]74*.*‘v 
(0.072) (0.089) (O.&) 
Resolution 0.028 0.030 0.031 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.031 ) 
n2 0.126 0.131 0.128 
(0.074) (0.079) (0.105) 
Bias -0.U.54 0.063 -o.ol.?*‘~ 
(0.OS7) (~.040) (0.029) 
Slope 0.173 0.167 0.158 
(0.082) (0.076) (0.078) 
Scatter 0.045 0.0.52 o.073*ly 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.042) 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
* p<o.os; ** p<O.Ol: *** p~0.001. 
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olution score nor n2 changed significantly over 
the four sessions of the experiment. Although 
some of the performance measures varied signifi- 
cantly in sessions 3 and 4, none of the measures 
of session 4 differed significantly from session 1. 
No significant differences in any of the per- 
formance measures were observed for the resolu- 
tion-feedback group and the control group in any 
of the sessions (all p-values >0.05). Both groups 
showed basically the same trends across sessions 
for each of the eight performance measures. Any 
session-to-session differences appear to be due to 
the difficulty levels of the sessions as measured 
by the proportion correct. The control group had 
the most difficulty with the forecasts of session 2 
(see Exhibit 2); the resolution-feedback group 
had the most difficulty with session 3 (see Exhibit 
4). 
attempts to improve their resolution scores. In 
session 1, the median number of different prob- 
abilities used was 6, but this dropped to 3 in 
session 4. In fact, by the third session, most 
subjects used only 0.5, 1.0, and a ‘middle-of-the- 
road’ probability. In contrast, all control group 
subjects used at least five different probabilities 
in session 4. Also, the control group increased its 
use of higher probabilities and decreased its use 
of lower probabilities over the course of the 
study. Both groups, however, became heavy 
users of 1.0 in the later sessions. 
The resolution-feedback group increased its 
usage of 0.5 and 1.0 probabilities. In fact, this 
group steadily increased its usage of 0.5 and 1.0 
probabilities across the four experimental ses- 
sions. In session 1, 21% of the forecasts were 0.5 
and 5% were 1.0; in session 4, 32% were 0.5 and 
18% were 1.0. In addition, all subjects resorted 
to using only a few different probabilities in their 
Such extensive use of extreme probabilities 
would typically increase the scatter of the fore- 
casts. Further, extensive use of 1.0 without a 
significant increase in knowledge would hurt 
both calibration and overforecasting. These pat- 
terns were observed for both the resolution- 
feedback group and the control group. 
4.4. Covariance-feedback group (Exhibit 5) 
Contrary to our expectations, the covariance 
feedback we provided was ineffective. Absolute 
bias (i.e. calibration-in-the-large) was the only 
measure on which the covariance-feedback 
Exhibit 5 
Means of performance measures for the covariance-feedback group. 
Session 
1 2 3 4 
Proportion correct 0.682 0.645 0.644 0.642 
(0.092) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) 
Brier Score 0.213 0.238*” 0.233 0.243 
(0.031) (0.038) (0.025) (0.039) 
Calibration 0.028 0.042 0.034 0.043*’ 
(0.017) (0.028) (0.025) (0.031) 
Overforecasting 0.00s o.102**w 0.087 0. 102*F 
(0.087) (0.095) (0.075) (0.089) 
Resolution 0.023 0.030 0.028 0.028 
(0.01 1) (0.018) (0.014) (0.01 1) 
?? 0.112 0.134 0.124 0.122 
(0.044) (0.079) (0.061) (O.OSO) 
Bias ~0.081 0.067*H -0.011***” -0.068***w *’ 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.038) (0.027) 
Slope 0.200 0.206 0.191 0.184 
(0.108) (0.066) (0.051) (0.047) 
Scatter 0.048 o.077**w 0.069 0.079 
(0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.039) 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
* p <o.os; ** [I < 0.01; *** p 10.0001. 
* Performance worse than previous session; ” performance better than previous session. 
’ First session performance better than last session performance; ’ last session performance better than first session performance. 
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group showed significant improvement. Improve- 
ments were observed in both sessions 2 and 3. 
While the group’s performance deteriorated sig- 
nificantly in session 4, their session 4 perform- 
ance was significantly better than in session 1 
( p = 0.034). The Brier Score, overforecasting, 
scatter, and calibration all deteriorated. For 
calibration, the deterioration was gradual; the 
others deteriorated in one step, between sessions 
1 and 2. No significant changes in resolution, 77’. 
or slope performance were observed. 
As was the case for the resolution-feedback 
group, no significant differences in any of the 
performance measures were observed for the 
covariance-feedback group and the control group 
in any of the sessions (all p-values >0.05). Also. 
no significant differences were observed between 
the performances of the covariance-feedback 
group and the resolution-feedback group (all 
y-values >O.OS). Thus, the provision of 
covariance feedback and training apparently 
were no more effective than either resolution 
feedback and training or simple outcome 
feedback. 
Like the control group, the median number of 
different probabilities used was 6 in both sessions 
1 and 4. Also like the control group, the 
covariance-feedback group decreased its use of 
0.5 probabilities over the course of the study 
(from 25% of their forecasts in session 1 to 14% 
in session 4) and increased its use of 1.0s (from 
9% to 21%). Nearly all of the covariancc-feed- 
back subjects (13 of the 16 subjects) reported 
being overwhelmed by the feedback. Most indi- 
cated that because there was too much informa- 
tion to deal with, they focused primarily on 
trying to improve the slope of their covariance 
graphs. The above-noted shift in probability 
usage is consistent with such efforts. 
5. Discussion 
For confidence judgments in general-knowl- 
edge tasks, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) 
found that calibration feedback and training im- 
proved both the subjects’ calibration and over- 
confidence performances. The present study 
generalizes those results to probability forecast- 
ing tasks. For the calibration-feedback group. we 
observed a significant improvement in calibration 
and overforecasting relative to the control group. 
Furthermore, as in Lichtenstein and Fischhoff’s 
study. virtually all of the improvement in calibra- 
tion occurred in one step. However, in their 
study the improvement occurred in the second 
session, while in ours it occurred in the third 
session. While this disparity could be a result of 
the differences in the feedback and training of 
the two studies, we believe it is due to differ- 
ences in the tasks. 
In particular, there are fundamental differ- 
ences in what can be learned from feedback in 
the two tasks. In general-knowledge tasks, sub- 
jects respond to a series of almanac-type ques- 
tions drawn from different subject domains. The 
information provided by feedback - whether it 
be outcome feedback, performance feedback, or 
both -bears only on the subject’s probability 
usage. It helps the subject assess the appropri- 
ateness of her expressions of confidence. An- 
swers to unrelated almanac questions (i.e. out- 
come feedback) will not help the subject to 
answer future questions. In a series of forecast- 
ing tasks, however. particularly when the events 
being predicted arc related as in the present 
study, feedback may inform the subject about 
not only the appropriateness of her probability 
usage, but about external reality as well (e.g. the 
predictability of the events in question). Thus, 
feedback may lend support not only to the judg- 
mental process the subject uses to assign a num- 
ber to her predictive belief, but also to the 
reasoning process [Smith et al. (1991)] that gen- 
erated the belief. In forecasting tasks, it may 
simply take more experience with the task and 
more than one round of feedback to realize the 
benefits of feedback. [For other differences be- 
tween forecasting and general-knowledge tasks, 
see Wright and Ayton ( 1986).] 
Based on the results of the control group, 
outcome feedback was not sufficient to improve 
calibration and ovcrforccasting. In fact, both 
deteriorated in this study. On all pcrformancc 
measures except absolute bias. the control 
group’s performance in session 4 was either un- 
changed or worse than in session 1. This general 
inability of outcome feedback to improve prob- 
ability judgments is consistent with previous find- 
ings [e.g. Fischer (19X2)]. 
Our resolution and covariance feedback and 
training turned out to be no more effective than 
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outcome feedback. There were no statistically 
significant differences between the performances 
of these groups and the control group for any of 
the eight performance measures in any of the 
four sessions. We believe that the failure of the 
resolution feedback was due primarily to the fact 
that it did nothing to improve the substance of 
the subjects’ knowledge about the events being 
forecasted. The training was designed to help the 
subjects understand the resolution concept, to 
motivate them to improve their resolution, to 
discourage them from using high probabilities 
when they had little information to go on, and to 
help them sort their forecasts into categories 
based on the extent of their knowledge of the 
events in question. However, it provided no new 
information to the subjects about the games or 
teams for which they were asked to make predic- 
tions; in other words, it provided no environ- 
mental feedback. 
Even though we encouraged the use of mean- 
ingful probability values, resolution-group sub- 
jects apparently focused more strongly on dis- 
tinct forecast categories than on the probabilities 
associated with the categories. This was evi- 
denced by their increased use of 0.5s and 1.0s 
over the course of the study and by their post- 
experiment interviews. In addition, subjects’ use 
of only three or four different probability values 
following the receipt of feedback may have been 
due to our use of only four knowledge categories 
in the feedback and training. Future studies 
should permit subjects to sort the events to be 
forecast into as many different knowledge 
categories as they care to use. 
We believe that the failure of the covariance- 
feedback group to outperform the control group 
was due in part to the amount of feedback 
provided to subjects in each session. Subjects 
received their Brier Scores, four component 
scores from the covariance decomposition, a 
covariance graph, outcome feedback, informa- 
tion on the Brier Scores of others in their group, 
and the rank of their Brier Score within the 
group. In addition, we encouraged the subjects 
to minimize their Brier Score by maximizing 
their slope and minimizing their scatter scores. 
Having to attend to so much information and to 
multiple objectives probably resulted in cognitive 
overload. In post-experiment interviews, three 
subjects indicated some ‘confusion’ over what to 
do with the feedback, and 13 subjects com- 
plained of ‘too much information in the feed- 
back’. None of the subjects in any of the other 
groups made such comments. By comparison, 
the performance feedback and training provided 
to the other groups was much more focused. 
Future studies should either reduce the amount 
of feedback (for example, to just slope and 
scatter) or increase the number of feedback ses- 
sions to give subjects sufficient time to under- 
stand and exploit the session-to-session variation 
in the various feedback components. 
The differential effects of feedback are re- 
flected in the probability values the subjects 
chose to use. All groups that received per- 
formance feedback (i.e. all groups but the con- 
trol) shifted from using two-digit probabilities to 
one-digit probabilities. In addition, both the 
calibration and resolution groups used fewer dif- 
ferent probabilities in later sessions. These re- 
sults suggest that the provision of focused per- 
formance feedback and training (i.e. that re- 
ceived by the calibration and resolution feedback 
groups) led subjects to reduce the number of 
probability categories to which they attended in 
order to better manage their forecasts relative to 
the performance incentives. 
6. Conclusion 
We began this paper by describing the four 
types of feedback that are relevant in judgmental 
forecasting tasks: outcome, performance, pro- 
cess, and environmental feedback. We end the 
paper by describing what has been learned about 
these feedback types and what questions remain 
unanswered. 
This study has confirmed earlier work finding 
that forecasters need more than just outcome 
feedback to improve the accuracy of their fore- 
casts. The information content of outcome feed- 
back apparently is not sufficient to either in- 
crease forecasters’ knowledge of the event in 
question or to help forecasters assign better 
probability labels to their forecasts. Something 
more is needed. 
We found that the additional information pro- 
vided by focused, personalized performance 
feedback did help improve forecast accuracy. In 
particular, calibration feedback and training was 
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shown to improve forecasters’ abilities to assign 
meaningful probability labels to their forecasts 
(i.e. to improve their calibration and overfore- 
casting). Such improvement is critically impor- 
tant to forecast users. The better calibrated the 
forecaster, the more her probability forecasts are 
like relative frequencies, and the easier they are 
to interpret and use. For example, having re- 
ceived a 0.8 probability of the stock market 
rising from a well-calibrated securities analyst, 
the forecast user need not be concerned with 
how to interpret the probability or how much to 
adjust the forecast to compensate for overfore- 
casting. The user knows that 80% of the time 
when a 0.8 forecast is issued, the event will 
occur. 
Several questions concerning calibration feed- 
back remain unanswered and await future re- 
search: Will calibration performance deteriorate 
if calibration feedback is cut off? Will the effects 
of calibration feedback and training for one fore- 
casting task transfer to another forecasting task? 
Can further improvement in calibration be real- 
ized through other types of feedback? The re- 
sults of the present study are strong enough, 
however, that we recommend that practitioners 
not wait for the answers to these questions to 
begin exploiting calibration feedback. It should 
be employed both in training probability forecas- 
ters and as part of a program of periodic, per- 
sonalized performance feedback. 
Our results suggest that improvement in 
forecasters’ discrimination skills (i.e. resolution) 
requires more than comprehension of the resolu- 
tion concept and related performance feedback; 
it requires better use of the forecaster’s existing 
knowledge of the event in question or an in- 
crease in that knowledge. The former could be 
accomplished through process feedback; the lat- 
ter through environmental feedback. We believe 
that process and environmental feedback repre- 
sent significant opportunities for improving the 
accuracy of probability forecasters. They should 
figure prominently in future studies of judgmen- 
tal forecasting. 
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